—in- and finite, in- and animate; natural, artificial; living, mechanical, dead... The list goes on, but we have lost the sense, say since the publication of Frankenstein, of what is artificial and mechanical being also inanimate, dead. Rather than make a mystery of a living machine, a finite body, or

After cinema what does memory do? This is the question I am trying to answer. By 'after cinema' I mean after its advent as a globally accessible technology, a globally successful technology, which spread out to all four corners of the world, since the world then had them,

or, How Recording Moving Images Has Changed Our Minds Indirectly, I've heard a reader ask, Where's he heading with these philosophers he's talking about? and, because it's gratifying to be read, I am answering the question. The philosophers I have been writing

I'm going to start with a long quote from Bergson but only pick out one or two threads to follow briefly: [from Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer's translation, Zone Books, NY, 1991. Online edition, at p.56, may differ.] This is to say that

For Spinoza, God or Nature, Substance, has infinite attributes of which we have access only to two: thought and extension. If perceptions are outside, they are attributes of substance. Bergson solves Spinoza's problem. To put it like this, Bergson solves Spinoza's problem, is completely false: that

The problem I have been dealing with is that of limiting virtual images to the body. Bergson's motor-diagramme seems to distinguish movements, the movements specifically across the surface of the brain of electrical impulses, to limn out the forms particular to . . . as I am doing now . . . the words