thigein & conatus

What is important is that thiscontemplation without knowledge, which at times recalls the Greek con-ception of theory as not knowledge but touching [thigein], here functions todefine life. As absolute immanence, a life . . . is pure contemplation beyondevery subject and object of knowledge; it is pure potentiality that preserveswithout acting.

– Giorgio Agamben, “Absolute Immanence,” p. 164

Spinoza’s theory of ‘striving’ (conatus) as the desire to persevere in one’sown Being, whose importance Deleuze often underlines, contains a possibleanswer to these questions. Whatever the ancient and medieval sources ofSpinoza’s idea (Harry A. Wolfson lists a number of them, from the Stoics toDante), it is certain that in each case, its paradoxical formulation perfectlyexpresses the idea of an immanent movement, a striving that obstinatelyremains in itself. All beings not only persevere in their own Being (visinertiae) but desire to do so (vis immanentiae). The movement of conatus thuscoincides with that of Spinoza’s immanent cause, in which agent and patientcannot be told apart. And since conatus is identical to the Being of the thing,to desire to persevere in one’s own Being is to desire one’s own desire, toconstitute oneself as desiring. In conatus, desire and Being thus coincide withoutresidue.

– Ibid., p. 166